Second-Personal Reasons and Tragic Rescue Cases
Stephen Darwall argues in his recently published book The Second Person Standpoint that the reasons that ground moral obligations are "second-personal all the way down." What exactly makes a reason second-personal (as opposed to, for example, third-personal, or "state-of-the-world-regarding", as Darwall puts it) is somewhat elusive, but the central point for Darwall seems to be that second-personal reasons are grounded in the authority that each of us has, as a member of the moral community, to make demands on (or, as Darwall puts it, "address claims to") others to act in certain ways. So, for example, if I am stepping on your gout afflicted toe, you have the authority to address a claim to me that I remove my foot. Because you have this authority (that is, because the claim, were you to actually address it to me, would be legitimate), I have an obligation to remove my foot from your toe. All obligations, for Darwall, have corresponding claims that others can legitimately address to the subjects of those obligations.
This all seems plausible enough in the case in which I am stepping on your gouty toe. In this case it seems that not only do you have the authority to address a claim to me that I remove my foot from your toe, but you have a special kind of authority that others don't have. Others might justifiably be indignant at my causing you gratuitous pain, but the fact that it's your pain puts you in a special position to complain about my conduct. We might think that the legitimacy of your claim in particular grounds a "second-personal" reason for me to remove my foot from your toe. And it is not implausible to think that this reason, rooted in the special complaint that you have against my causing you pain, is the source of the moral obligation that I have to do so.
But it's difficult to see how this account can be generalized to cover all of our moral obligations. Consider the following case:
Darwall does not explicitly address a case of this sort in his book, but he does argue that as members of the moral community, we all have the authority to address claims to others in cases in which they have moral obligations. So when I step on your gouty toe, not only you, but everyone has the authority to address a claim to me that I remove my foot. In this case you have a special claim to the removal of my foot, but everyone can legitimately address a claim that I do so. So we might think that Darwall can account for cases of morally required aid in Tragic Rescue Cases by claiming that everyone, including the fifty, have the authority to address a claim with the content "save ten of the fifty".
In some sense it seems true that in the case I described, and indeed in all cases in which one person is morally obligated to aid or refrain from or cease harming another, all members of the moral community are entitled to address a claim to her that she do so. But the fact that in the Tragic Rescue Case everyone, including the fifty, is entitled to make only a demand with the person-neutral content "help ten of us/them", it is difficult to see what is supposed to be second-personal about the demand such that the reason that grounds the moral obligation to save ten is also second-personal. It seems much more natural to think that the reasons that ground the obligations in Tragic Rescue Cases are third-personal, state-of-the-world-regarding reasons. Whether second-personal reasons, rather than third-personal ones, ground obligations in other kinds of cases is a more difficult matter, though I'm inclined to think that state-of-the-world-regarding reasons provide a more solid foundation for all moral obligations.
This all seems plausible enough in the case in which I am stepping on your gouty toe. In this case it seems that not only do you have the authority to address a claim to me that I remove my foot from your toe, but you have a special kind of authority that others don't have. Others might justifiably be indignant at my causing you gratuitous pain, but the fact that it's your pain puts you in a special position to complain about my conduct. We might think that the legitimacy of your claim in particular grounds a "second-personal" reason for me to remove my foot from your toe. And it is not implausible to think that this reason, rooted in the special complaint that you have against my causing you pain, is the source of the moral obligation that I have to do so.
But it's difficult to see how this account can be generalized to cover all of our moral obligations. Consider the following case:
You are out in a small boat and come upon fifty people in danger of drowning. Your boat can only accommodate ten people, and there is not time to make more than one trip to shore. Furthermore, there are no other boats in the area, and no one close enough to aid in any other way. No matter what you do, at least forty of the fifty will die.Now I take it for granted that in this Tragic Rescue Case you are obligated to save ten of the fifty, and that morally speaking it doesn't matter which ten (none are relatives or friends, all are equally deserving, etc...). So it seems that none of the fifty have the authority to address a claim to you with a content such as "help me" or "you ought to help me". Your obligation to aid is not an obligation to anyone; you don't owe aid to any particular individuals, but you are required to provide as much aid as you can given the circumstances. Since no one has the authority to address a demand to you to help her in particular, it's difficult to see how the reasons that ground your moral obligation are supposed to be second-personal.
Darwall does not explicitly address a case of this sort in his book, but he does argue that as members of the moral community, we all have the authority to address claims to others in cases in which they have moral obligations. So when I step on your gouty toe, not only you, but everyone has the authority to address a claim to me that I remove my foot. In this case you have a special claim to the removal of my foot, but everyone can legitimately address a claim that I do so. So we might think that Darwall can account for cases of morally required aid in Tragic Rescue Cases by claiming that everyone, including the fifty, have the authority to address a claim with the content "save ten of the fifty".
In some sense it seems true that in the case I described, and indeed in all cases in which one person is morally obligated to aid or refrain from or cease harming another, all members of the moral community are entitled to address a claim to her that she do so. But the fact that in the Tragic Rescue Case everyone, including the fifty, is entitled to make only a demand with the person-neutral content "help ten of us/them", it is difficult to see what is supposed to be second-personal about the demand such that the reason that grounds the moral obligation to save ten is also second-personal. It seems much more natural to think that the reasons that ground the obligations in Tragic Rescue Cases are third-personal, state-of-the-world-regarding reasons. Whether second-personal reasons, rather than third-personal ones, ground obligations in other kinds of cases is a more difficult matter, though I'm inclined to think that state-of-the-world-regarding reasons provide a more solid foundation for all moral obligations.
posted by Brian Berkey at 8:41 PM
https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=18266847&postID=6848837964781547628&isPopup=true Comments:
I am very sympathetic to your view that if Darwall does not address this particular case in his book then he has not sufficiently presented the best possible explanantion for his account of reasons that ground moral obligations. However, you say that you are "inclined to think that state-of-the-world regarding reasons provide a more solid foundation for all moral obligations." I could not find a clear definition of these reasons, maybe I didnt look clearly enough, but what exactly are these state-of-the-world reasons in your view just for curiosity's sake?
Also, on a side note, what are your feelings about moral responsibility? Take a case such as this: a man visits a village where he stubles upon the chief who gives him a choice to either murder one individual who is seemingly innocent, or twenty men will be murdered in place of this individual. Because he stumbled upon this situation, would he still be morally obligated to kill this one individual to save the twenty men or could he choose to opt out and not be found responsible for the death of the twenty men?
Tiffany,
First, the state-of-the-world-regarding reasons that I mentioned are reasons grounded in the impersonal value of states of affairs. So, a reason of this kind to save ten of the fifty drowning people in my example would be that the world would be better off if the ten (whichever ten they are) live than it would be if they die. The key is that the content of the reason makes no reference to any particular individuals, and no facts about any particular individuals ground the reason.
Your second question raises the often discussed distinction between doing and allowing. Many people have the intuition that one should not kill one innocent person in order to save twenty, and that in refusing to do so one in no way becomes responsible for the deaths of the twenty. I think this intuition is misguided. It's surely unfortunate that in your case one must choose between two very bad outcomes, but I see no reason to think that the less bad of the two shouldn't be chosen. If I can save many lives but choose not to, it seems to me that I bear at least some responsibility for the deaths that result from my inaction.
"Since no one has the authority to address a demand to you to help her in particular, it's difficult to see how the reasons that ground your moral obligation are supposed to be second-personal." 'Women and children first.' has the authority of tradition at least, and would provide grounds for making a speedy decision. Not a very second-personal principle tho'. I'd like to differ with you about tiffany's second question. The mathematics of morality does not work like this: one life good, two lives twice as good. The individual is infinitely valuable, so each one is as valuable as any number. The moral calculation is this: murder is wrong, therefore it is wrong to be persuaded to commit it by the threat of more murder.
I think my real problem with Darwall would be (happily, I haven't come across him) that I think morality is something far deeper than social relations, that it concerns personal identity and the nature of consciousness.
Brian, interesting post! I think you have a compelling counterexample there. We might derive others from Parfit's non-identity problem, where bad outcomes occur to people who would otherwise not exist (and hence lack the counterfactual grounding to claim any "harm" was done to them).
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