Cullity's Argument Against the Extreme Demand
In chapter 8 of his extremely interesting recent book The Moral Demands of Affluence (which I highly recommend) Garrett Cullity puts forward an argument that he takes to refute the view that we are morally obligated to live what he calls an "altruistically-focused life." By "altruistically-focused life," Cullity means a life the primary aim of which is to better the lot of the world's worst-off people. This is the sort of life, and according to Cullity the only sort of life, that is prescribed by what he calls the "Extreme Demand." The Extreme Demand refers to the familiar view of what morality requires of the world's better off individuals held by such philosophers as Peter Singer, Peter Unger, Shelly Kagan, and, as many of my readers will be aware, by me. I think Cullity's argument fails, and after setting out the argument, I'll explain why.
Cullity's argument consists of three central claims (I'll quote Cullity in laying them out):
Elsewhere in chapter 8, Cullity puts the basic claim of 3) in what seems to me simpler language. He essentially says that if it would be wrong for one to have X, then I cannot have a morally compelling reason to help her get X. But it seems to me that in order for this claim to go through we must make certain assumptions about what can count as reasons that many proponents of the Extreme Demand (e.g. all those who accept a broadly consequentialist ethical framework) would reject. Specifically, we must accept that I cannot have a reason to act so as to increase the level of well-being of a person P if P, morally speaking, ought to be sacrificing such that her level of well-being is lower. But we can easily construct cases in which at least some (e.g. consequentialists) will accept that we do have morally compelling reasons to increase someone's well-being despite the fact that if that person were acting morally she would have a lower level of well-being.
Imagine a case in which I can help Jane, who wants very much to have a career as a concert violinist, get into a prestigious music school by, say, writing her a letter of recommendation. Jane is a more than qualified candidate with a great deal of musical talent, and I know that if she were to get into the school she would be very likely to have a successful career, and her music would bring enjoyment to many people. Now of course it's true that in order for Jane to develop her musical talents to the degree necessary to have the career that she wants, she will have to expend considerable resources, which could otherwise be donated to help the world's worst off people, and spend a great deal of time perfecting her craft, which she could otherwise spend doing aid work. So according to the Extreme Demand, it would be wrong for Jane, given the current state of the world, to pursue her music career.
Does it follow from this that it would be wrong for me to write Jane a letter of recommendation? I don't think that it does. After all, I might know that if Jane were not to get into the prestigious music school, she would instead pursue a different career that would involve her to no greater extent in helping the world's worst off people. I might also know that if she does not get into the school, then Jill, who has less talent than Jane, and who also cares very deeply about the poor and intends to join a non-profit that helps the world's worst off people in the event that she does not get in, will be admitted. In other words, my refusal to help Jane would not result in a better outcome for anyone, let alone the world's off people, who would then be deprived of Jill's efforts on their behalf. In this case it seems clear that the Extreme Demand, interpreted in the broadly consequentialist manner that its most prominent defenders endorse, actually requires helping Jane to achieve the fulfilments of the non-altruistically-focused life that she has chosen to lead.
Of course Cullity may be thinking about cases of a different sort when he puts forward his argument. He may take it to be the case, for example, that one can have morally compelling reasons to, say, help Jane pay for music school rather than donating the relevant funds to Oxfam. And the Extreme Demand surely does deny that, in the actual world, we can have morally compelling reasons to do this. But I take it that this is a strength, rather than a weakness, of the Extreme Demand. While a music school education is no doubt of tremendous value, the Extreme Demand rightly tells us that its value cannot give us compelling reasons to fail to save the lives of many innocent children around the world who will unnecessarily die without our help.
Cullity's argument consists of three central claims (I'll quote Cullity in laying them out):
1) Helping people is obviously morally required in response to their interests in the fulfilments of a non-altruistically-focused life.Now I agree with Cullity that there can be cases, even in the actual world, in which we are morally required to help people achieve certain fulfilments as part of lives that are non-altruistically-focused, so I accept 1), though I think the occasions on which we're required to so help others are limited by the more stringent requirements that we have to help the world's worst-off people. I'm also inclined to agree with 2); those who enjoy the satisfactions of a non-altruistically-focused life in a world in which others are as badly off as the world's worst-off people actually are behave wrongly, according to the Extreme Demand. Where I take issue with Cullity's argument is claim 3).
2) The Extreme Demand implies that the interests to which we are responding in such cases are interests in having what it is wrong to have, since the Extreme Demand requires us to lead altruistically focused lives.
3) When your interest in having (or doing) a certain thing is an interest in having (or doing) what it would be wrong for you to have (or do), that interest cannot be a good reason for morally requiring me to help you to get (or do) it.
Elsewhere in chapter 8, Cullity puts the basic claim of 3) in what seems to me simpler language. He essentially says that if it would be wrong for one to have X, then I cannot have a morally compelling reason to help her get X. But it seems to me that in order for this claim to go through we must make certain assumptions about what can count as reasons that many proponents of the Extreme Demand (e.g. all those who accept a broadly consequentialist ethical framework) would reject. Specifically, we must accept that I cannot have a reason to act so as to increase the level of well-being of a person P if P, morally speaking, ought to be sacrificing such that her level of well-being is lower. But we can easily construct cases in which at least some (e.g. consequentialists) will accept that we do have morally compelling reasons to increase someone's well-being despite the fact that if that person were acting morally she would have a lower level of well-being.
Imagine a case in which I can help Jane, who wants very much to have a career as a concert violinist, get into a prestigious music school by, say, writing her a letter of recommendation. Jane is a more than qualified candidate with a great deal of musical talent, and I know that if she were to get into the school she would be very likely to have a successful career, and her music would bring enjoyment to many people. Now of course it's true that in order for Jane to develop her musical talents to the degree necessary to have the career that she wants, she will have to expend considerable resources, which could otherwise be donated to help the world's worst off people, and spend a great deal of time perfecting her craft, which she could otherwise spend doing aid work. So according to the Extreme Demand, it would be wrong for Jane, given the current state of the world, to pursue her music career.
Does it follow from this that it would be wrong for me to write Jane a letter of recommendation? I don't think that it does. After all, I might know that if Jane were not to get into the prestigious music school, she would instead pursue a different career that would involve her to no greater extent in helping the world's worst off people. I might also know that if she does not get into the school, then Jill, who has less talent than Jane, and who also cares very deeply about the poor and intends to join a non-profit that helps the world's worst off people in the event that she does not get in, will be admitted. In other words, my refusal to help Jane would not result in a better outcome for anyone, let alone the world's off people, who would then be deprived of Jill's efforts on their behalf. In this case it seems clear that the Extreme Demand, interpreted in the broadly consequentialist manner that its most prominent defenders endorse, actually requires helping Jane to achieve the fulfilments of the non-altruistically-focused life that she has chosen to lead.
Of course Cullity may be thinking about cases of a different sort when he puts forward his argument. He may take it to be the case, for example, that one can have morally compelling reasons to, say, help Jane pay for music school rather than donating the relevant funds to Oxfam. And the Extreme Demand surely does deny that, in the actual world, we can have morally compelling reasons to do this. But I take it that this is a strength, rather than a weakness, of the Extreme Demand. While a music school education is no doubt of tremendous value, the Extreme Demand rightly tells us that its value cannot give us compelling reasons to fail to save the lives of many innocent children around the world who will unnecessarily die without our help.
posted by Brian Berkey at 2:26 AM
http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=18266847&postID=726614451984409163&isPopup=true Comments:
Brain,
(1) If the Singers, Ungers, and Berkeys of the world feel (deliberate choice of words) you have a moral obligation to improve the lot of other people, whatever and wherever you deign, YOU are free to do so with YOUR resources, not others' resources. If utilitarians are content with those boundaries, fine, it's when the calculators make the calculations for others using others' resources, then we are doing politics, not doing ethics, much less acting morally. In politics, at least, I can hope for Madison's "collective wisdom" to offset utilitarian Do-Gooders' proclivities to calculate the good, or what's best for others.
(2) Too many "special cases" avail. Of what use, then, is a maxim (however reformulated and by whom) that one has to "exempt" cases? Blaise Pascal might call that "casuistry in extremis." Imagine: "Do X, except in Y, but sometimes C, but never D." Computers can follow an algorithm, but humans follow rules, only if we're lucky.
(3) Altrusim (empathy, sympathy, benevolence, etc.) is an emotion, a disposition, a biological implant, not a DUTY (which comes from reason). It disposes us to do good, act tit-for-tat, helping others, increasing our social glue, etc., in trade for their benevolence, but as the Golden Rule or other benevolent rules subsume, one has the ability to have an analagous emotion, not that one MUST HAVE IT in every situation (unless, of course, god tells us to) or to act in accordance with it (unless, again, god tells us to).
Hopefully, a well-developed character will see the other's point of view and often act with that point of view in his own deliberations of practical reason, but to make it a DUTY adds what to the dynamic? That "I must do to others as I would have them do to me?" What if in my head, pain is pleasurable, and I want to be punished, and that is how I want people to treat me? (These people exist.) Using that standard, guess what follows? Another "special case?"
Making one aware of the disposition and its cultivation for our "mutual good" is both necessary and sufficient. Making it a "duty" by the laws of reason may not be reasonable.
If the DUTY were: feel for another as one feels for himself, I'd agree with it (or "regard" fits nicely, too, but not "act.") Presumptively, if one "feels" or "regards" the other in his decision-making and acting, we all benefit. That's the force of benevolence theory, not making a duty to act on an emotion.
We can examine the relative value of our actions at the time we make them, but we cannot know the full and exact consequences until they show up on our doorstep. Jane may decide to use her musical talent to hold a benefit concert for starving children, thus fulfilling a moral responsibility. Altruism is a secondary passion, because as human beings we have a drive for self preservation. We begin to care about distant suffering once we have secured ourselves. Couldnt your example be construed as such. By helping Jane get her education and thus securing her future as a musician, we then can allow her the luxury of charity to someone else.
On a slightly more practical note, I am not convinced that aid agencies such as Oxfam do anything other than increase dependancy.
You cannot get rid of poverty by giving people money
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