A Constraint Against Imposing Unrequired Sacrifice?
Liam Murphy argues that we should accept a constraint against imposing unrequired sacrifices on others. The intuitive idea behind such a constraint is that if a person is not herself required to make a sacrifice, then it would be inappropriate for others to force her to make it. Now there is significant intuitive force in this thought, however it seems to me that accepting such a constraint exacerbates existing problems for Murphy's own view of morality's demands, and presents problems for other views as well. In fact, I cannot think of a single overall view of morality's demands on which such a constraint seems plausible.
Murphy's fair share view has the consequence that individuals who are less well-off than they would be under full compliance with morality's demands are not obligated to make any sacrifices at all in order to promote the well-being of others. So someone who is extremely poor is not, on Murphy's view, obligated to rescue a child drowning in a shallow pond if doing so would require ruining his clothes (perhaps they are the only clothes that he owns). Now this in itself is a troubling consequence of the fair share view; but even if we can live with that consequence (perhaps we think it would be inappropriate to require altruistic behavior of someone whose life has been so thoroughly lacking), it seems very difficult to accept that it is not even permissible for me to act so as to ensure that he rescues the child, if I cannot rescue him myself. Imagine that I see the child drowning from a considerable distance, and know that I cannot rescue him in time myself. I also know that, barring my intervention, the extremely poor individual (assume he is the only one who can possibly rescue the child) will not save the child because he does not want to ruin his clothes. I can, however, press a button that will trip him, at which point he will fall into the pond. With his clothes already ruined, he will then rescue the child. Murphy is committed to saying that I am not even permitted to press the button, since doing so would be imposing an unrequired sacrifice on the poor man. But it seems clear that in this case pushing the button is at least permissible, if not required.
The constraint against imposing unrequired sacrifice will also be unacceptable to the many philosophers who support relatively egalitarian redistributive taxation and at the same time reject the view that, in the absence of such taxation, well-off individuals are required to make significant sacrifices of their personal wealth in order to promote the well-being of the less fortunate. Thomas Nagel has argued for such a view, holding that while it may be unreasonable to think that morality requires individuals to make great sacrifices of their wealth for the sake of others, it is not unreasonable for the government to tax the wealthy heavily in order to aid the poor. If this is the case then the government, by adopting heavily progressive tax policies, would be imposing what would otherwise be unrequired sacrifices on individuals.
A thoroughly consequentialist view might have the fewest cases in which it would be acceptable to impose unrequired sacrifices on individuals, since on such a view most of the sacrifices that we might be in a position to impose on people are sacrifices that the theory says they are required to make anyway. But there will be exceptions to this rule whenever the best outcome can be achieved by imposing a sacrifice on someone that, in the absence of her being forced, she would not be required to make because her doing so in the absence of force would not lead to the best outcome. Such cases would surely be rare in the actual world, so that a practical policy of not imposing unrequired sacrifices on individuals would be basically adoptable on a consequentialist view, but of course we can imagine cases for which such policy would prevent us from acting rightly.
It seems, then, that the intuitive thought behind the constraint against imposing unrequired sacrifice is misguided.
Murphy's fair share view has the consequence that individuals who are less well-off than they would be under full compliance with morality's demands are not obligated to make any sacrifices at all in order to promote the well-being of others. So someone who is extremely poor is not, on Murphy's view, obligated to rescue a child drowning in a shallow pond if doing so would require ruining his clothes (perhaps they are the only clothes that he owns). Now this in itself is a troubling consequence of the fair share view; but even if we can live with that consequence (perhaps we think it would be inappropriate to require altruistic behavior of someone whose life has been so thoroughly lacking), it seems very difficult to accept that it is not even permissible for me to act so as to ensure that he rescues the child, if I cannot rescue him myself. Imagine that I see the child drowning from a considerable distance, and know that I cannot rescue him in time myself. I also know that, barring my intervention, the extremely poor individual (assume he is the only one who can possibly rescue the child) will not save the child because he does not want to ruin his clothes. I can, however, press a button that will trip him, at which point he will fall into the pond. With his clothes already ruined, he will then rescue the child. Murphy is committed to saying that I am not even permitted to press the button, since doing so would be imposing an unrequired sacrifice on the poor man. But it seems clear that in this case pushing the button is at least permissible, if not required.
The constraint against imposing unrequired sacrifice will also be unacceptable to the many philosophers who support relatively egalitarian redistributive taxation and at the same time reject the view that, in the absence of such taxation, well-off individuals are required to make significant sacrifices of their personal wealth in order to promote the well-being of the less fortunate. Thomas Nagel has argued for such a view, holding that while it may be unreasonable to think that morality requires individuals to make great sacrifices of their wealth for the sake of others, it is not unreasonable for the government to tax the wealthy heavily in order to aid the poor. If this is the case then the government, by adopting heavily progressive tax policies, would be imposing what would otherwise be unrequired sacrifices on individuals.
A thoroughly consequentialist view might have the fewest cases in which it would be acceptable to impose unrequired sacrifices on individuals, since on such a view most of the sacrifices that we might be in a position to impose on people are sacrifices that the theory says they are required to make anyway. But there will be exceptions to this rule whenever the best outcome can be achieved by imposing a sacrifice on someone that, in the absence of her being forced, she would not be required to make because her doing so in the absence of force would not lead to the best outcome. Such cases would surely be rare in the actual world, so that a practical policy of not imposing unrequired sacrifices on individuals would be basically adoptable on a consequentialist view, but of course we can imagine cases for which such policy would prevent us from acting rightly.
It seems, then, that the intuitive thought behind the constraint against imposing unrequired sacrifice is misguided.
posted by Brian Berkey at 8:36 PM
http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=18266847&postID=3372370613574189320&isPopup=true Comments:
Hi Brian, this is Conrad.
After a few discussions in class, what I feel is that philosophy can help people make a better decision when they encounter a situation, but that maybe not a perfect solution for everyone because everyone has their own bottom line and they can accept different theories by their free will. If we accept a constraint against imposing unrequired sacrifices on others, then it is unreasonable for the government to tax the wealthy heavily in order to aid the poor because healthier may not want to do that. In this case, I believe that this rule is unacceptable since taxation is a good way for country to rescue the poverty. If we ask people to use free will to determine if they are willing to sacrifice their wealth to help some unkown individuals, most of them are probably run away because they believe that some people may do their job and their effort is not necessary. However, I agree with the rules because sometimes even though we sacrifice for others, it may not turn out the best outcome. For example, if the extremely poor individaul rescues the little child, that child may become a killer after he growth. This may turn out as a bad outcome. In my own view, I think we can never predict the outcome accurately. This rule is useless, and it misleads readers to be cold-blooded. Let’s ignore what philosphy talks about, if everyone refuse helping others, the society will become a mess. I disgree what Murphy says because the actual wrold is unpredictable, and we should act rightly and morally at that critical point.
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