Morality as a Project?

Certain views of morality's demands are sometimes attacked because, according to critics, conforming to the proposed demands would interfere with agents' abilities to have the kinds of personal projects that give shape and meaning to our lives, and according to some, without which human lives may cease to be worth living at all. Such critics don't necessarily deny that projects with explicitly altruistic aims can be the sort that can provide meaning within a life, although they are usually concerned to defend non-altruistic projects as morally acceptable, or else as providing reasons for agents that can override those provided by morality. Those who press this view seem to think, not implausibly, that part of what it is to live a distinctly human life is to have such projects, and to develop a motivational structure such that acting in ways that further one's pursuit of one's projects becomes a kind of practical necessity. Given this fact, morality must, on this view, either accommodate this fact about humans within its structure, so as not to impose demands that conflict with the pursuit of (perhaps only some of) our projects, or else give way to (some of) our projects when conflicts between its demands and the reasons provided by our projects arise (so that the reasons provided by morality will sometimes fail to be overriding).

The importance of personal projects to our individual lives is undeniable, and the tension between the reasons provided by the non-altruistic projects that most of us have and the demands of morality is a difficult issue that proponents of any objective theory of morality's demands must face. Of course it is particularly problematic for proponents of very demanding moral theories, and since I'm inclined to accept the view that morality is rather demanding, it is one that I must take on.

I certainly don't have anything close to a fully satisfactory response to this line of criticism of views of morality's demands such as mine. In fact, much of what I want to do here is to explain why certain responses are not particularly helpful. This may help to point us in more a more fruitful direction, but then again it may turn out that the conflict is simply irresolvable; if, as I'm inclined to believe, the state of the world in morally relevant respects is bad enough that we cannot, consistent with certain extremely plausible assumptions (such as that morality demands more of similarly situated individuals the worse the world is in morally relevant respects), deny that morality demands a great deal of us, it may turn out that living a moral life is, given the actual state of the world, inconsistent with living what I above called a "distinctly human life."

But why, we might wonder, should we be so pessimistic about this apparent tension. If living a distinctly human life requires that we have projects that give shape and meaning to our lives, and devotion to which promotes a certain kind of motivational structure, why can't we simply adopt as a project, perhaps as our most important project, the living of a moral life? Why can't morality itself be a project that we take on, in the same way that we might take on the project of becoming a great chef or philosopher? Perhaps in a world that is as bad in morally relevant respects as ours this is the only sort of central project that it is morally acceptable to adopt.

This suggestion is pretty clearly unacceptable. As Susan Wolf points out, morality does not seem to be an appropriate object of passion in the way that the concrete projects that most of us adopt are. To be devoted to morality itself (rather than, say, to a particular morally worthy project such as ending homelessness) would seem objectionably fetishistic, requiring a kind of alienation from one's everyday activities (whether or not such activities are particularly morally good) that is incompatible with the sort of devotion to those activities that is involved in having genuine projects. If, while engaging in work aimed at ending homelessness one were regularly considering whether or not working for educational equality would be morally better, and were one disposed to abandon working to end homelessness if that seemed to be the case, it wouldn't be clear that one could be said to have a project at all. One's actions would be done not as a part of a larger undertaking devotion to which helps to structure one's motivations and give shape to one's life, but would be mere responses to the external conditions that one observes and reflects upon in a more or less detached way. Adopting morality itself as a central project would require one to incorporate into one's motivational structure the most unattractive feature of the Kantian moral agent, namely the disposition to always act from a motive to do one's duty, and for no other reason.

Perhaps a better suggestion on behalf of the view that morality is (at least in the actual world) very demanding is that those who are well-off are morally required to have central projects that are altruistically-focused. On this view morality can require that we not incorporate certain kinds of projects into our lives, but cannot require that we be inclined to abandon the altruistically-focused projects that we have adopted when opportunities to do even more good arise. One might defend such a view on what Railton has called "sophisticated consequentialist" grounds by arguing that, in the long run, our being disposed to continue to pursue our (altruistically-focused) projects will allow us to do more good than the weaker dispositions to stick with those projects that would be required by a less sophisticated consequentialism.

This approach is, I think, better, but it still fails to address many of the most important concerns of those who claim that recognizing the significance of personal projects in our lives requires that we abandon the view that morality is extremely demanding.

As Mike points out in a comment to my previous post, one might admire those who adopt altruistically-focused projects without at the same time finding such projects attractive for one's own pursuit. Wolf's view that most of us would find the character of a moral saint unappealing might be, as I suggested, false, without it being the case that living a life centered around altruistically-focused projects could be personally fulfilling for everyone.

This is important because much of the criticism directed at demanding views of morality by those who stress the importance of personal projects focuses on the ways in which such projects enrich our individual lives, and provide us with sources of personal fulfillment that only genuine projects can. If it's true that many people could not lead fulfilling lives centered around altruistically-focused projects, then the view that morality allows individuals to have projects, but only altruistically-focused ones, does not address the problem so often highlighted by critics of demanding views of morality. Furthermore, it would, I think, be implausible to simply suggest that in fact everyone can live a fulfilling life centered around altruistically-focused projects.

While it's true that many people underestimate the personal satisfaction that can accompany altruistic actions and projects, whether one can live a fulfilling life centered around altruistically-focused projects will depend on a variety of factors, including the values that one has oneself internalized, which will very often depend significantly on the prevailing values of one's society, community, and family. It will also, relatedly, depend on the extent to which having such projects is compatible with developing meaningful personal relationships and being an involved and accepted member of one's community.

The problem, once we recognize these facts, is that it is very likely to be more difficult, and perhaps much more difficult, to live a fulfilling life centered around altruistically-focused projects in societies that are worse off in morally relevant respects than it will be in societies that are much better off, morally speaking. In societies in which altruism is less common (which also tend to be societies that exhibit greater inequality and have more individuals in desperate need), one who adopts altruistically-focused projects is likely to be more isolated from the community at large (this is perhaps especially true of one who is well-off and lives in a well-off community), and to have fewer opportunities to develop the kinds of relationships that do the most to enrich our lives. Individuals in such societies are also, of course, less likely to be taught and to internalize altruistic values, and so the thought of adopting altruistic projects will likely strike people in such societies as alien and unattractive in ways that it wouldn't strike individuals in societies that have a more altruistic or egalitarian ethos.

But this means that if we accept that the ability of individuals to structure their lives around fulfilling personal projects is important enough to outweigh the specifically moral concerns of those who believe that morality is extremely demanding, then we are committed to thinking that morality can be less demanding in societies that are worse off in morally relevant respects than in morally better societies, because in such societies individuals will be less able to live fulfilling lives structured around altruistically-focused projects. Morality will be less demanding in circumstances in which most people (including some who cite the importance of personal projects as a reason to reject the view that morality is extremely demanding) think it must be more demanding.

This suggests that perhaps we ought to reconsider the objection to demanding views of morality that cites the importance of personal projects to our ability to live fulfilling lives. But while we might conclude that the objection fails, we do not, it seems, have a satisfying response to the concerns of its proponents. Concluding that the objection fails may require us to accept that, at least in societies that are badly off enough in morally relevant respects, morality requires some individuals to live lives that are not personally fulfilling. This is not a pleasant conclusion, but it may be one that taking morality seriously requires us to accept.