Phil 108: Family, Country, and Race
Some people believe that patriotic partiality is morally permissible, while rejecting the thoroughly communitarian account of morality defended by MacIntyre. Patriotic partiality, on these views, is often taken to be similar to partiality toward one's family - and since even most who endorse what MacIntyre calls "liberal universalism" believe that family partiality is permissible, it is plausible to think, according to those who defend the compatibility of universalism and patriotism, that patriotic partiality can be justified within a universalist framework as well.
Others are skeptical of the attempt to defend patriotic partiality by suggesting that it is, in morally relevant respects, similar to family partiality. Paul Gomberg, for example, claims that patriotic partiality has more in common with racial partiality than it does with family partiality - and since racial partiality is clearly morally unacceptable, we should, according to Gomberg, reject patriotic partiality as well.
There is much that seems clearly right to me about Gomberg's claim that patriotism is quite similar to racism. After all, which country one is born in is just as morally arbitrary as what color skin one is born with. It seems obvious that neither factor should, in itself, have any impact on the degree of moral consideration that others owe to one. Furthermore, none of us have personal relationships with all of our compatriots, while one thing that might plausibly be thought to ground the permissibility of family partiality is the personal relationships that most people have with their family members. Choosing to save the life of a stranger who happens to share one's citizenship status rather than a stranger from another country for no reason other than that the former is from one's country seems at least somewhat arbitrary, in the way that choosing to save a member of one's own race merely because she shares one's race seems objectionably arbitrary. On the other hand, most people think that choosing to save a family member rather than a stranger simply because the former is a family member is at the very least permissible; some would even claim that saving the family member is required.
The challenge for those who claim that patriotism is compatible with universalism, then, would appear to be to explain why we should think that patriotic partiality is different, morally speaking, than racial partiality. There are a few things that might be said in an attempt to meet this challenge, though I admit to not finding any of them terribly convincing. First, we might think that the fact that we share a politcal community with our co-nationals makes it the case that we have a special relationship (despite in most cases lacking a personal relationship) to them that we don't have to those outside our nation, and that this relationship grounds the permissibility of giving extra moral weight to their interests. We might simultaneously deny that there is any such special relationship that we have to those who share our race, either because race is simply not a morally important category, or, more strongly, because race is an illusion altogether. The truth of the latter claim would certainly provide a distinction (though not necessarily a morally relevant one) between race and co-nationality, because there clearly are facts about, for example, citizenship status, whereas the view that race is an illusion denies that there are any facts at all about race. In addition, we might think that the fact that we do not have personal relationships with all of our co-nationals does not distinguish the grounds for accepting the permissibility of family partiality from the grounds for accepting the permissibility of national partiality. We might, for example, think that it would be permissible (or obligatory) for one to save the life of a long lost uncle that one had never met before encountering him in a life threatening situation (of course we must imagine that the potential rescuer knows of the biological relationship) rather than saving an acquantaince simply because the former is a family member. If this is correct, then we might think that in a range of cases national partiality is justified in just the same way that family partiality is, and that whether or not one has a personal relationship with those to whom she is partial is irrelevant.
Interestingly, Stephen Nathanson, who defends the view that patriotism is compatible with universalism, does not say any of these things. Instead, he claims that just as the sort of patriotism that he defends, which he calls "moderate patriotism," is acceptable, so too is what Gomberg critically referred to as "moderate racism." Just as it is permissible to give extra consideration, beyond what is owed to everyone, to some simply because they are one's co-nationals, it is permissible to give extra consideration to some simply because they are members of one's own race. "Moderate racism," on this view, is not morally objectionable, because it does not involve one in giving those of other races less consideration that is owed to everyone in virtue of the principles of universal morality.
This view essentially says that there is a minimum level of consideration owed to everyone, and that beyond that we can choose to give extra consideration to some for what seem clearly to be morally arbitrary reasons, such as that they share one's race. I'm inclined to think that this view is incorrect, but even if it is right, the way in which it justifies patriotism seems to make patriotism nothing more than morally tolerable (and only in limited circumstances). It is certainly not a virtue, and seems to be morally on a par with giving preference to some because they share one's race, or eye color, or favorite TV show, or brand of toothpaste. And if it morally no different than partialities like these, then it is not clear why we should be inclined to accept it in the first place. Given the tendency of any form of partiality, if systematically practiced, to lead to avoidable inequalities, woudn't we do better according to what we actually value (equality over partiality based on race/toothpaste brand/etc.) to simply reject the claim that national partiality is permissible?
Others are skeptical of the attempt to defend patriotic partiality by suggesting that it is, in morally relevant respects, similar to family partiality. Paul Gomberg, for example, claims that patriotic partiality has more in common with racial partiality than it does with family partiality - and since racial partiality is clearly morally unacceptable, we should, according to Gomberg, reject patriotic partiality as well.
There is much that seems clearly right to me about Gomberg's claim that patriotism is quite similar to racism. After all, which country one is born in is just as morally arbitrary as what color skin one is born with. It seems obvious that neither factor should, in itself, have any impact on the degree of moral consideration that others owe to one. Furthermore, none of us have personal relationships with all of our compatriots, while one thing that might plausibly be thought to ground the permissibility of family partiality is the personal relationships that most people have with their family members. Choosing to save the life of a stranger who happens to share one's citizenship status rather than a stranger from another country for no reason other than that the former is from one's country seems at least somewhat arbitrary, in the way that choosing to save a member of one's own race merely because she shares one's race seems objectionably arbitrary. On the other hand, most people think that choosing to save a family member rather than a stranger simply because the former is a family member is at the very least permissible; some would even claim that saving the family member is required.
The challenge for those who claim that patriotism is compatible with universalism, then, would appear to be to explain why we should think that patriotic partiality is different, morally speaking, than racial partiality. There are a few things that might be said in an attempt to meet this challenge, though I admit to not finding any of them terribly convincing. First, we might think that the fact that we share a politcal community with our co-nationals makes it the case that we have a special relationship (despite in most cases lacking a personal relationship) to them that we don't have to those outside our nation, and that this relationship grounds the permissibility of giving extra moral weight to their interests. We might simultaneously deny that there is any such special relationship that we have to those who share our race, either because race is simply not a morally important category, or, more strongly, because race is an illusion altogether. The truth of the latter claim would certainly provide a distinction (though not necessarily a morally relevant one) between race and co-nationality, because there clearly are facts about, for example, citizenship status, whereas the view that race is an illusion denies that there are any facts at all about race. In addition, we might think that the fact that we do not have personal relationships with all of our co-nationals does not distinguish the grounds for accepting the permissibility of family partiality from the grounds for accepting the permissibility of national partiality. We might, for example, think that it would be permissible (or obligatory) for one to save the life of a long lost uncle that one had never met before encountering him in a life threatening situation (of course we must imagine that the potential rescuer knows of the biological relationship) rather than saving an acquantaince simply because the former is a family member. If this is correct, then we might think that in a range of cases national partiality is justified in just the same way that family partiality is, and that whether or not one has a personal relationship with those to whom she is partial is irrelevant.
Interestingly, Stephen Nathanson, who defends the view that patriotism is compatible with universalism, does not say any of these things. Instead, he claims that just as the sort of patriotism that he defends, which he calls "moderate patriotism," is acceptable, so too is what Gomberg critically referred to as "moderate racism." Just as it is permissible to give extra consideration, beyond what is owed to everyone, to some simply because they are one's co-nationals, it is permissible to give extra consideration to some simply because they are members of one's own race. "Moderate racism," on this view, is not morally objectionable, because it does not involve one in giving those of other races less consideration that is owed to everyone in virtue of the principles of universal morality.
This view essentially says that there is a minimum level of consideration owed to everyone, and that beyond that we can choose to give extra consideration to some for what seem clearly to be morally arbitrary reasons, such as that they share one's race. I'm inclined to think that this view is incorrect, but even if it is right, the way in which it justifies patriotism seems to make patriotism nothing more than morally tolerable (and only in limited circumstances). It is certainly not a virtue, and seems to be morally on a par with giving preference to some because they share one's race, or eye color, or favorite TV show, or brand of toothpaste. And if it morally no different than partialities like these, then it is not clear why we should be inclined to accept it in the first place. Given the tendency of any form of partiality, if systematically practiced, to lead to avoidable inequalities, woudn't we do better according to what we actually value (equality over partiality based on race/toothpaste brand/etc.) to simply reject the claim that national partiality is permissible?
posted by Brian Berkey at 1:25 AM
http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=18266847&postID=8427929418046533805&isPopup=true Comments:
The thing that I think defenders of moderate patriotism/racism will say is that complete equal consideration of all races, cultures, nationalities, etc. in all circumstances, threatens the diversity of culture, race, etc. This view would assume that in order to have cultural, racial diversity, we need to be partial to certain cultures and races. This view, if not false, seems far fetched. In order for racial diversity to be threatened by complete racial consideration, there would need to be mass cross breeding of races s.t. the human race becoming one race is a distinct and eminent possibility (note that human race not being one race sounds odd). The threat to cultural diversity would be even more odd; if all cultures were to mash into one big culture, why would this mean that cultural diversity is lost? It seems unlikely that we could ever have a cultural mix s.t. aspects of the cultures that make up the mix are not noticed or outstanding.
Brian,
Why can't partiality towards one's country be justified on contractual grounds?
While it's true that nationality, strictly speaking, is arbitrary, the nation nevertheless provides things that any individual would need to survive. Security would be the most obvious example.
Under this view, because the state of your citizenship provides for your physical/bodily integrity, you have some sort of obligation to be partial towards it.
While it might be the case that other countries will provide for a certain level of security while you are in its borders, I think the fact that you are not a citizen of that particular country means that it is not especially obligated to protect your security in the same way that your country does.
In other words, while it might be the case that all countries will provide for a certain minimum level of security for you, your country is obligated to do more than this minimum. Therefore, you might need to be more partial to your country.
This would obviously need more fleshing out, but I think it sounds plausible.
I am not understanding the contractual partiality that is mentioned above. Safety, rights, etc. granted to U.S. citizens and only U.S. citizens can certainly be seen as partiality. But perhaps a particular kind of partiality.
I can see the parallel between the partiality one might have for their country with a similar kind of partiality one might have for his or her parents/family. I would not grant that these feelings of preferential treatment are the same. Nathanson uses this same line of reasoning to convince us that to do away with patriotism, we must also do away with the same partiality we might have in a friendship or family relationship.
The question I think is whether or not ANY partiality is morally justifiable.
Stephen Nathanson claims that "moderate racism" is not morally objectionable, for he believes that "moderate racism" is okay "because it does not involve one in giving those of other races less consideration than is owed to everyone in virtue of the principles of universal morality." However, in practice, such “moderate racism” is problematic, for how can we determine the minimum level of consideration owed to everyone? Moreover, giving extra consideration to certain people because of their race creates inequality, and such inequality, which is not based on merit, is morally objectionable. Such things as our race, nationality, and physical traits do not reflect how we will act, think, or work or whether or not we are good, well-behaved people, so partiality based on these characteristics is entirely unwarranted and unreasonable since decisions based on this kind of partiality will not necessarily result in what is best for the decision maker or others affected by his or her decision(s).
Hey Brian! I'm really enjoying your blog, but I couldn't follow the link at the top of your post. Could you provide me with the link? Thanks!
Sorry Bryce - I fixed the link, so it should work now.
Brian
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